Ryan v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 174 F.Supp.3d 486 (2016)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Cina A. RYAN, Plaintiff,
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 14-cv-1422 (TSC)
|
Signed March 31, 2016
Synopsis
Background: Requester, proceeding pro se, brought
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), alleging
inadequate search in response to request for records
bearing his name. FBI moved for summary judgment.
[Holding:] The District Court, Tanya S. Chutkan, J., held
that FBi performed adequate search.
Motion granted.
West Headnotes (9)
[1] Records
In general; freedom of information laws
in general
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
provides a statutory right of public access
to documents and records held by federal
government agencies. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a).
Cases that cite this headnote
[2] Federal Civil Procedure
Records, disclosure, and privacy, cases
involving
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases
are typically and appropriately decided on
motions for summary judgment. 5 U.S.C.A. §
552(a).
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[3] Federal Civil Procedure
Records, disclosure, and privacy, cases
involving
When an agency moves for summary
judgment on the grounds that it has
discharged its Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) obligations, all underlying facts and
inferences are analyzed in the light most
favorable to the FOIA requester, and only
after the agency proves that it has fully
discharged its FOIA obligations is summary
judgment appropriate. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a).
Cases that cite this headnote
[4] Federal Civil Procedure
Records, disclosure, and privacy, cases
involving
An agency will be granted summary judgment
on the adequacy of its Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) search if it shows
beyond material doubt that it has conducted
a search reasonably calculated to uncover all
relevant documents. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a).
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[5] Records
In general; request and compliance
The question is not whether there might
exist any other documents possibly responsive
to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request, but rather whether the search for
those documents was adequate. 5 U.S.C.A. §
552(a).
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[6] Records
In general; request and compliance
Adequacy of a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) search is judged by a standard of
reasonableness and depends on the facts
of each case; there is no requirement that
an agency seek every record system, rather a search may be reasonable if it includes
all systems that are likely to turn up the
information requested. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a).
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[7] Records
In general; freedom of information laws
in general
Courts are mindful in Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) actions that congressional intent
tilts the scale in favor of disclosure. 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552(a).
Cases that cite this headnote
[8] Records
In general; request and compliance
To meet its burden and show adequacy
of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
search, an agency may rely on reasonably
detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted
in good faith; these declarations are accorded
a presumption of good faith, which cannot be
rebutted by purely speculative claims about
the existence and discoverability of other
documents. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a).
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[9] Records
In general; request and compliance
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
performed adequate search in response to
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
for all records bearing requester’s name;
requester believed he was under surveillance
by the FBI, FBI searched its case file system
for records of requester’s name, but found
no records, and FBI additionally searched its
electronic surveillance system, despite finding
no case file, using variations of requester’s
name, but found no records. 5 U.S.C.A. §
552(a).
Cases that cite this headnote
Attorneys and Law Firms
*487 *488 Cina A. Ryan, Chevy Chase, MD, pro se.
Peter Rolf Maier, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Washington,
DC, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TANYA S. CHUTKAN, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Cina A. Ryan brings this FOIA action seeking
all files and records bearing his name, or any variant
of it. Defendants, after conducting multiple searches and
finding no responsive records, filed a first motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 4), which the court granted
in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 19). Defendants
conducted a further search, and now renew their motion
for summary judgment. (ECF No. 21). For the following
reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who brings this action pro se, alleges that he has
been under constant FBI surveillance since shortly after
September 11, 2001. (Compl. ¶ 8). In October 2010, he
submitted a FOIA/Privacy Act request for his “complete
FBI file.” (Hardy First Decl. ¶ 6). After being told that
he had not filed sufficient information for a search to be
conducted, Plaintiff provided additional information, and
in November 2010, the FBI notified him that it had not
located any main file records responsive to his request,
and any requests pertaining to government watch lists
could not be confirmed or denied pursuant to FOIA
Exemption (b)(7)(E), 5 U.S.C. § (b)(7)(E). (Id. ¶¶ 7-10).
Plaintiff appealed the FBI’s response to the Department of
Justice Office of Information Policy, which subsequently
affirmed the FBI’s response. (Id. ¶ 11). On August 20,
2014, Plaintiff filed this suit.
In its first Motion for Summary Judgment, the FBI
detailed how it conducted phonetic searches of both its
Automated Case Support System (“ACS”) and Electronic
Surveillance indices (“ELSUR”) for responsive records.
(Id. ¶¶ 27-28). The ACS is used to conduct FOIA searches
of the agency’s Central Records System (“CRS”). (Id.
¶ 15). The CRS contains “administrative, applicant,
criminal, personnel, and other files compiled for law
enforcement purposes.” (Id.). The system consists of a numerical sequence of files that are broken down
according to subject matter, but because the CRS cannot
be queried for data, the information in it is duplicated and
moved to the ACS to be searched. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16). ACS
is then queried using alphabetized General Indices. (Id. ¶
17). The General Indices include main entries, which carry
“the name corresponding with a subject of a file contained
in the CRS,” and reference entries, also called cross-
references, which are “generally only a mere mention or
reference to an individual, organization, or other subject
matter contained in a document located in another main
file on a different subject matter.” (Id.). By searching the
General Indices, the FBI can determine what information
it may have in its CRS files on a particular subject matter
or individual, such as in this dispute, “Cina A. Ryan.” (Id.
¶ 18). The FBI does not index every name in its files, only
information it considers pertinent, relevant, or essential
for future retrieval. (Id. ¶ 20). Certain records contained in
the CRS are maintained at FBI headquarters, while others
are maintained in field offices. (Id. ¶ 15).
The ELSUR indices maintain information on subjects
whose electronic and/or voice communications have been
intercepted by the FBI. (Id. ¶ 21). The ELSUR system
is separate from the CRS. It contains information on
“individuals who were the (a) targets of direct surveillance,
(b) *489 participants in monitored conversations, and (c)
owners, lessors, or licensors of the premises where the FBI
conducted electronic surveillance.” (Id. ¶ 22). Like CRS,
ELSUR indices are maintained both in field offices and at
FBI headquarters. (Id. ¶ 24).
The FBI’s phonetic searches in ACS and ELSUR
used Plaintiff’s first name, middle initial, and last
name, including the alternative versions of Plaintiff’s
name “Cina A. Ryan,” “Alireza Shishechi,” and “Sina
Ryan.” (Id. ¶¶ 27-28). No main or cross reference entries
subject to FOIA were found in ACS, nor were responsive
records found in ELSUR. (Id.). Since searches in both
CRS and ELSUR failed to locate any information about
plaintiff, Defendant moved for summary judgment for the
first time on October 9, 2014. (Hardy Third Decl. ¶ 15(b)).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the searches, the court
found that: (1) nothing in the record suggested that the
FBI transferred any of Plaintiff’s records to any other
agency or contractor for management since CRS would
have recorded their transfer, and no such records were
found; (2) a requester’s demand that certain records
systems be searched did not obligate the agency to search
those systems, since the FBI demonstrated these systems
would not be expected to contain responsive records; (3)
there was no reason to believe that documents created
or physically located in field offices would not have been
indexed in the searched records systems; and (4) the
FBI’s search methodology in CRS using all reasonable
permutations of Plaintiff’s name was adequate. (First
Summ. J. Op. at 7-14). Therefore, the Court granted
summary judgment on the issue of whether the FBI
searched appropriate locations. (Id. at 15).
However, the court denied summary judgment as to
one search. The court determined that “the record did
not clearly demonstrate that the ELSUR database was
searched in a way that would reveal documents indexed
to all variations of Plaintiff’s name.” (Id.). While the
third declaration from David Hardy, the Section Chief of
the Record/Information Dissemination Section, Records
Management Division of the FBI, noted that “the FBI’s
ELSUR Indices were searched using both the names
‘Cina A. Ryan,’ and ‘Cina Ryan,’ as well as the other
names [Plaintiff] provided,” Hardy’s prior declarations
only “establish[ed] that the FBI ran searches in ELSUR …
for ‘Cina A. Ryan,’ ‘Alireza Shishechi,’ and ‘Sina Ryan.’
Other names (‘Cina Rayan,’ ‘Sina Rayan,’ ‘Cina A.
Rayan,’ ‘Sina A. Rayan,’, and ‘Cina Ryan’) were used to
search CRS but are not specifically identified as having
been used to search ELSUR.” (Id. at 14) (internal citations
omitted). While the FBI could reasonably have believed
that, “based on the phonetic search function, running
an additional search for ‘Cina Ryan’ in ELSUR would
be unnecessarily duplicative,” given the ambiguity in the
declarations, the court did not have enough evidence to
conclude that the ELSUR search was conducted in an
adequate manner. (Id. at 14-15).
Following the court’s ruling, the FBI subsequently
conducted further queries and now renews its motion
for summary judgment, arguing that its searches of the
ELSUR database are adequate to meet its obligations
under FOIA. Plaintiff again opposes summary judgment,
arguing that the searches are still not adequate.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no
genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a);
*490 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “A fact is ‘material’
if a dispute over it might affect the outcome of a suit
under governing law[.]” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d
889, 895 (D.C.Cir.2006) (internal citation omitted). In
determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists,
the court must view all facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct.
1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The moving party bears the
“initial responsibility of informing the district court of
the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits … which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct.
2548 (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving
party, in response, must “go beyond the pleadings and
by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50, 106 S.Ct.
2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
“[T]he judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249, 106
S.Ct. 2505.
[1] “FOIA provides a ‘statutory right of public
access to documents and records’ held by federal
government agencies.” Citizens for Responsibility &
Ethics in Washington v. DOJ, 602 F.Supp.2d 121, 123
(D.D.C.2009) (quoting Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408,
413 (D.C.Cir.1982)). FOIA requires that federal agencies
comply with requests to make their records available
to the public, unless such “information is exempted
under clearly delineated statutory language.” Id. (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted); see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a), (b).
[2] [3] [4] “FOIA cases are typically and appropriately
decided on motions for summary judgment.” Gold
Anti–Trust Action Comm., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of
Fed. Reserve Sys., 762 F.Supp.2d 123, 130 (D.D.C.2011)
(internal citation omitted). When an agency moves for
summary judgment on the grounds that it has discharged
its FOIA obligations, all underlying facts and inferences
are analyzed in the light most favorable to the FOIA
requester, and only after the agency proves that it
has fully discharged its FOIA obligations is summary
judgment appropriate. Moore v. Aspin, 916 F.Supp. 32,
35 (D.D.C.1996); Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
705 F.2d 1344, 1350 (D.C.Cir.1983). An agency will
be granted summary judgment on the adequacy of its
search if it “show[s] beyond material doubt [ ] that it has
conducted a search reasonably calculated to uncover all
relevant documents.” Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1114
(D.C.Cir.2007) (citing Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1351).
[5] [6] [7] “The question is not whether there might exist
any other documents possibly responsive to the request,
but rather whether the search for those documents was
adequate.” Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d
548, 551 (D.C.Cir.1994) (emphasis in original) (internal
citation omitted). Adequacy “is judged by a standard of
reasonableness and depends, not surprisingly, on the facts
of each case.” Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d
1476, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1984). “There is no requirement that
an agency seek every record system,” rather a search may
be *491 reasonable if it includes all systems “that are
likely to turn up the information requested.” Oglesby v.
U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C.Cir.1990).
Courts are mindful, however, that “congressional intent
tilt[s] the scale in favor of disclosure.” Morley, 508 F.3d at
1114 (internal citation omitted).
[8] To meet its burden and show adequacy, “the agency
may rely on reasonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits
submitted in good faith.” Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485.
These declarations are “accorded a presumption of good
faith, which cannot be rebutted by ‘purely speculative
claims about the existence and discoverability of other
documents.’ ” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d
1197, 1200 (D.C.Cir.1991) (internal citation omitted). An
agency can show “reasonableness” in its affidavit by
“setting forth the search terms and the type of search
performed, and averring that all files likely to contain
responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched.”
Sanders v. Obama, 729 F.Supp.2d 148, 155 (D.D.C.2010),
aff’d sub nom., Sanders v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 10–
5273, 2011 WL 1769099 (D.C.Cir. Apr. 21, 2011) (internal
citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
[9] The sole issue in dispute here is whether Defendant
adequately searched the ELSUR indices. In support of its Motion, Defendant provided a Fourth Declaration
from David Hardy to address concerns the court identified
in its prior Opinion. In his declaration, Hardy explains
that because ELSUR only contains information gathered
as a result of electronic surveillance, related information
necessarily required for such surveillance would be
maintained in a case file in CRS; for example, all court
records authorizing the electronic surveillance. (Hardy
Fourth Decl. ¶ 7). Therefore, the “existence of a CRS
record is a condition precedent for the existence of
records in the ELSUR system.” (Id.). Since there were
no responsive records found in CRS, the FBI would not
expect to find any records in the ELSUR system. (Id.).
Nonetheless, in response to the court’s Opinion, the FBI
conducted additional searches in ELSUR, this time using
the variations of Plaintiff’s name “Cina Rayan,” “Sina
Rayan,” “Cina A. Rayan,” and “Sina A. Rayan.” (Id. ¶¶
9-10). Those searches yielded no responsive information.
Plaintiff, however, contends these searches are still not
adequate, although certain of his arguments do not appear
to be responsive to the FBI’s assertions. First, Plaintiff
challenges whether the searches the FBI undertook were
conducted in good faith. (Pl. Opp’n ¶¶ 10-12). Specifically,
Plaintiff queries whether “the FBI has demonstrated that,
in the past, it has never misled courts of law in this type
of case,” and states, without any factual basis, that he is
“100% certain” that the FBI is still concealing thousands
of pages of his records. (Id. ¶ 10). Plaintiff also asks
whether the court has verified the FBI’s affidavits against
his FOIA request records to confirm whether they are
true. (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiff alludes to alleged statements
by former FBI Director Robert Mueller and President
Obama discussing surveillance, which the court interprets
as a challenge to the FBI’s good faith. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33).
Second, Plaintiff discusses his general frustration at his
inability to obtain counsel in this matter. (Id. ¶¶ 16-19).
Third, he alleges that the government and judicial system
are biased against him and those who are not “at the
top.” (Id. ¶ 34). Fourth, Plaintiff states that a letter he sent
to former FBI Director Mueller in 2011 did not appear to
be in the docket on *492 PACER. (Id. ¶¶ 35-36). 1
Fifth,
Plaintiff alleges that there is a YouTube video of him
discussing how the FBI controls his mind under the name
“Singh R.” (the court construes this mention of a possible
alias to relate to the adequacy of the agency’s search). (Id.
¶ 48). Finally, Plaintiff asks the court to provide him with
guidance to enable him to better pursue his case. (Id.).
The court addresses Plaintiff’s arguments mindful that
“[a]document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’
and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.’ ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94,
127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (internal citation
omitted). 2
Having reviewed the Defendants’ motion, the Fourth
Hardy Declaration, and the record herein, the court
finds that the FBI has conducted an adequate search for
responsive records corresponding to Plaintiff’s request.
Any ambiguity the court found in Defendant’s prior
motion as to whether it searched ELSUR for the name
“Cina Ryan” is eliminated by the clear explanation in
Hardy’s Fourth Declaration that (i) a failure to find
responsive documents in CRS means that Defendant is
unlikely to find responsive records in ELSUR; and (ii)
that prior ELSUR searches did include variations of
the names Plaintiff has gone by—including the name
on his government-issued identification. (Hardy Fourth
Decl. ¶ 8). Moreover, Defendant further supported the
adequacy of its search by conducting additional searches
in ELSUR using different possible phonetic spellings
of Plaintiff’s name. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10). Defendant’s search
methodology was discussed in “detailed, nonconclusory
affidavits submitted in good faith,” Weisberg, 745 F.2d
at 1485, and provided the search terms used, the files
searched, and explicitly declared that all files likely to
contain responsive records were searched. Sanders, 729
F.Supp.2d at 155. This satisfies Defendant’s burden to
demonstrate it has conducted an adequate search for
records responsive to Plaintiff’s request.
In contrast, none of Plaintiff’s arguments are availing,
because they do not deal with the adequacy of the
search, nor do they raise any genuine material issue
of fact. “[F]actual disputes that are ‘irrelevant or
unnecessary’ do not affect the summary judgment
determination.” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895 (D.C.Cir.2006)
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). With
regard to Plaintiff’s otherwise unsupported allegation
of bad faith, the court notes that agency declarations
in FOIA disputes are presumed to be in good faith,
and that presumption “cannot be rebutted by ‘purely
speculative claims about the existence and discoverability
of other documents.’ ” SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d
at 1200, (citing Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C.Cir.1981)). But that is all
Plaintiff provides—conclusory, unfounded allegations of
wholesale government crimes and conspiracies, while
submitting no fact based allegation that Defendant
is attempting to mislead the court. 3
Additionally, as
Plaintiff noted in *493 his Opposition, the FBI directly
responded to Plaintiff’s concerns of bad faith in Hardy’s
Third Declaration, including his allegations regarding the
S, H, and I drives. (Pl. Opp’n ¶ 11).
Plaintiff’s assertions regarding his inability to obtain
counsel are similarly unresponsive to the Defendants’
Motion. While it is undoubtedly difficult for a non-
lawyer to represent himself, the court has taken Plaintiff’s
pro se status into account and tried to address the
Plaintiff’s claims in language understandable to a non-
lawyer, including, amongst other things, holding a hearing
at Plaintiff’s request, and addressing multiple non-
substantive issues.
As to the letter which Plaintiff alleges he sent in 2011 to
then-FBI Director Mueller, Plaintiff states that he signed
the letter with the name “Cina Ryan.” (Pl. Ex. 24). Since
this is a name Defendant specifically queried in CRS,
based on the Hardy Declarations, it is clear that if such
a letter was received by Defendant, it was not indexed.
(Hardy Fourth Decl. ¶ 8). The failure to index this letter
—if the FBI actually received it—is likely because “[t]he
decision to index names other than subjects, suspects,
and victims is a discretionary decision,” and Defendant
“indexes only that information considered to be pertinent,
relevant, or essential for future retrieval,” which it may
not have found the allegations of government misconduct
contained in the letter to be. (Hardy First Decl. ¶ 20).
Lastly, while a YouTube video of Plaintiff under the name
“Singh, R.” may exist, it is not an FBI file, and Plaintiff has
not previously alleged that he has gone by that name, nor
that the FBI would have any reason to search for records
responsive to that name. Plaintiff’s Complaint requests his
“complete file” responsive to “his name, Cina A. Ryan
and any and all variant spelling such as Cina Ryan, Sina
Ryan, and the name he was formerly known by, Alireza
Shishechi.” (Compl. at 1). The FBI conducted multiple,
adequate phonetic searches in CRS and ELSUR for all
possible variants of these requested names.
“While the pleadings of pro se parties are to be ‘liberally
construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ ‘[t]his benefit
is not … a license to ignore the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure [.]’ ” Neuman v. United States, 70
F.Supp.3d 416, 422 (D.D.C.2014) (internal citations
omitted). “Accordingly, in the context of Rule 56, a ‘pro
se plaintiff must meet his burden of proving that there
exists a genuine dispute as to a material fact to survive
a motion for summary judgment.’ ” Mokhtar v. Kerry,
83 F.Supp.3d 49, 61 (D.D.C.2015) (citing Id.). The court
finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden under Rule
56, because he raises no genuine issue of material fact,
and Defendant has met its burden by demonstrating the
adequacy of its search.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FBI has conducted an adequate search for any records
responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request. Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED.
A corresponding order will issue separately.
All Citations
174 F.Supp.3d 486
Footnotes
1 Plaintiff attached a copy of the letter to his Opposition. (Pl. Opp’n., Ex. 24)
2 The court will not discuss Plaintiff’s various allegations of government misconduct unrelated to this FOIA dispute. See
generally, Pl’s Opp’n.
3 Plaintiff alleges that the court’s use of the word “allegations” is “unfair, unjust,” and “prejudicial.” (Pl. Opp’n ¶¶ 11, 19). The
word allegation connotes an unproven statement. See ALLEGATION, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“allegation
n. (15c) 1. A declaration that something is true; esp., a statement, not yet proved, that someone has done something
wrong or illegal. 2. Something declared or asserted as a matter of fact, esp. in a legal pleading; a party’s formal statement
of a factual matter as being true or provable, without its having yet been proved; averment.”).
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