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PEOPLE v. GUERRA
Court of Appeal of California, Third Appellate District
March 28, 2003, Filed
C039593
Reporter
2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3207 ; 2003 WL 1611417 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GUADALUPE BELTRAN GUERRA, Defendant and Appellant. Notice: [1] NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL
REPORTS CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, RULE
977(a), PROHIBITS COURTS AND PARTIES FROM
CITING OR RELYING ON OPINIONS NOT CERTIFIED
FOR PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED,
EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BY RULE 977(B). THIS
OPINION HAS NOT BEEN CERTIFIED FOR
PUBLICATION OR ORDERED PUBLISHED FOR THE
PURPOSES OF RULE 977.
Prior History: Sacramento. Super.Ct.No. 99F08999.
Disposition: Affirmed.
Core Terms
gun, shooting, shot, disorder, delusional, trailer, time of
the shooting, suffering, opined, implant, insane,
interviewed, time of offense, paranoid schizophrenia,
telephoned, suspicion, happened, bullet, sanity, mental
disorder, police station, action plan, psychologist,
microchip, questions, Clinical, truck
Judges: HULL, J. We concur: DAVIS, Acting P.J.,
NICHOLSON, J.
Opinion by: HULL
Opinion
A jury convicted defendant Guadalupe Beltran Guerra of
assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)) —
count one), in which he personally used a firearm (Pen.
Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) and personally inflicted
great bodily injury causing paralysis (Pen. Code, §
12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant was also convicted of
mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203 – – count two), in which he
personally discharged a firearm and caused great bodily
injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In a bifurcated
proceeding, the jury found that defendant was sane at
the time of the crimes. The trial court found that he had
suffered three prior robbery convictions. He was
sentenced to state prison for 58 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends the evidence [*2] of
sanity was insufficient. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Defendant’s contention requires a detailed statement of
facts.
Prosecution case-in-chief
On November 5, 1999, William Delaney, then age 44,
went to the home of Danny Cole, which was next to
defendant’s trailer in Sacramento County. Delaney had
known defendant for about four months and had
contacts with him on approximately six prior occasions
during which they discussed the Bible and scripture.
Defendant and Delaney never argued or disagreed.
At approximately 3:00 p.m., defendant drove Delaney
down the street to check on Delaney’s girlfriend, Cindy
Padilla, who was helping a friend move some items.
Defendant then drove Delaney back to Cole’s house.
During the 15-minute trip, defendant and Delaney talked
about “the Lord” and scripture, and said a prayer. There
was no disagreement during their discussion. Delaney
and Padilla left Cole’s residence.
At approximately 4:30 p.m., Delaney and Padilla
returned to Cole’s residence and saw defendant, who
was standing near the end of his truck that was parked
in the driveway next to his trailer. Padilla then went to meet her friend.
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At approximately 6:00 p.m., Delaney [3] and Cole contacted defendant at the end of defendant’s truck to see if he would give Delaney a ride home. Defendant looked at a telephone pole and asked Delaney if he heard a noise near the pole. Delaney responded that he did not hear anything and asked defendant if he would give him a ride.” Defendant said, “Sure, just a minute.” Cole left with his sister. At approximately 7:00 p.m., Delaney asked defendant if he had any of the Orange Crushes he had given to Cole a couple of days before. Defendant, who still stood at the end of his truck, said, “Yeah, they’re right inside the trailer.” Delaney walked to the trailer, stuck his head inside the doorway, and looked for the sodas but did not see them. He turned to ask defendant where the drinks were. Defendant was standing on the other side of the trailer door, which was approximately 12 feet away, and was pointing a dark gray .380- caliber handgun at him. Delaney extended his left arm and said, “Hey, hey.” Defendant looked at Delaney and shot him. The bullet severed Delaney’s left thumb, entered the left side of his chest, and struck his spinal cord, permanently paralyzing him. Delaney fell to the ground. Defendant stood two feet from [4]
Delaney, still pointing the gun at him and looking to see
if anyone was around. Delaney asked defendant to say
a prayer and then feigned that he was dead. Defendant
got into his truck and sped out of the driveway. Delaney
yelled for somebody to call 911. Cole’s sister and other
persons did so.
Sheriff’s deputies arrived at the scene at 7:12 p.m.
Delaney reported that defendant had shot him and that
he did not know why. A .380-caliber shell casing, which
was on the ground, was later determined to have been
fired from defendant’s gun.
At approximately this same time, Sacramento Police
Sergeant Schiele was at the police substation on
Franklin Boulevard. The substation is approximately a
five-minute drive from defendant’s trailer. Defendant
banged very loudly on the station’s front door. Schiele
opened the door and asked defendant what happened.
Defendant replied that he had “just shot a guy.” Schiele
asked why he had done that, and defendant responded,
“he just busted in and I shot him.” Schiele escorted
defendant into the station and asked him where the
weapon was. Defendant said that it was in his vehicle.
When asked whether he had any more weapons on
him, defendant indicated he [5] did not. After repeated questioning, defendant stated the victim was in some type of trailer in the area of Mendocino Boulevard and the Shadow Arms Apartments. Defendant commented, “Why God? Why did you let this happen? I don’t even like guns.” Defendant asked his mother why this happened and asked God not to let the victim die. When Sacramento County sheriff’s deputies arrived at the city police substation, defendant was slumped in his chair and did not respond physically or verbally to commands and questions. He complained of chest pains and was taken to a medical center. At the center, he acted very lethargic and refused to answer the deputies’ questions. He repeatedly asked the nurses how the person he shot was doing and if he was okay. When one nurse asked why he was there, he responded that he had shot someone. An officer recovered defendant’s gun from a pocket on the front seat of his truck. There were five live .380- caliber cartridges in the magazine, a live cartridge on top of the magazine, and a live cartridge in the chamber. Around midnight, defendant waived his constitutional rights and executed a waiver form, checking the boxes and writing his initials. He became [6] defensive,
evasive and uneasy when the interviewing officer asked
him questions. He indicated that “they” were “coming
around harassing us,” and his friend, Rick Delaney, got
shot. (Defendant knew William Delaney as Rick
Delaney.) When asked whether he was the one who
shot Delaney, defendant became very defensive,
denied having stated that he shot Rick, and stated he
did not want to talk to the officer anymore.
Delaney testified he and defendant never ingested any
alcohol or narcotics, and never argued or disagreed
prior to the shooting. He testified he was paralyzed
from the waist down and would never walk again. He
had no idea why defendant shot him.
Defense
Defendant testified on his own behalf that he ingested
methamphetamine on November 3 or 4, 1999, with
Delaney; that he purchased his gun for over $ 100 from
a relative in Stockton the day before the shooting
because he feared for his life; that the gun was loaded
with .38-caliber bullets when he purchased it; that he put
the gun under the seat cushion inside his trailer when
he returned home that day; that the day of the shooting
he put the gun in the waistband of his pants; that he
might have walked outside of his trailer [*7] with the
gun in his waistband; that he could have put two bullets
in his pocket; that the gun was in his hand when
Delaney was shot; that Delaney turned around, saw the
gun, and lunged at him; that he looked at Delaney after
Page 3 of 6
shooting him; and that he realized he had put a bullet
into Delaney’s body and Delaney’s life was threatened.
Defendant said the gun did not fire accidentally. He
“went straight to the Police Department and told them
what happened and told them where the gun was and . .
. told them [his] main concern is to get over there and
help Rick Delaney.” Defendant admitted telling police he
“just shot somebody,” and admitted never telling police
that Rick Guerra shot Delaney. Defendant testified,
“What had happened to Rick Delaney was a terrible,
terrible evil thing”; Delaney “didn’t deserve that”; and he
was sorry Delaney was shot.
Defendant claimed that he was harassed by voices and
law enforcement, that “they” had planted a liquidized
microchip in his body in 1991, that the implant
interfered with his thought pattern and began controlling
his behavior, that the implant tormented and tortured
him, and that he heard tormenting sounds when he shot
Delaney. He then claimed [8] he did not shoot Delaney and that Rick Guerra used defendant’s body through the implant to shoot Delaney. He claimed he was not responsible for shooting Delaney. He stated Delaney was his friend; he had never argued with Delaney; and there was no reason why he would shoot Delaney. Defendant admitted that the implant had not prevented him from controlling his behavior during the three weeks preceding his testimony. Defendant acknowledged that police officers had contacted him at approximately 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon of the shooting; that he could have hidden his gun under the seat cushion of the trailer when the police arrived; and that he did not tell police that he had been carrying the gun, or that there was a gun in his trailer. Defendant admitted that he was sentenced to prison for three 1985 convictions for robbery, two of which he perpetrated while armed. The crimes predated the implant and ulterior forces had not controlled him. Ricardo Guerra, a youth correctional counselor for the California Youth Authority, testified that he had never met defendant; that a man telephoned Ricardo Guerra’s mother’s home in late January 2000, identified himself as Lupe Guerra and asked [9] for Ricardo Guerra’s
father, who had died in 1998; that defendant telephoned
him a few days later on February 1, 2000; that
defendant asked him if he worked down south, if he
believed in Jesus, and if he knew certain people, whom
Guerra did not know; and that defendant telephoned
him at home and at work until February 9, 2000. The
essence of the telephone calls was that defendant “was
going to be exposing demons and bringing in Internal
Affairs and the press and that [Guerra] needed to come
clean and redeem” himself.
Psychologist Janice Nakagawa testified that she
interviewed and tested defendant in April, May, and
June of 2001. She reviewed defendant’s criminal
records, offense reports and writings related to the
defense. She did not have an opinion whether
defendant was suffering from a mental disorder on the
date of the shooting. She diagnosed him as having a
psychotic disorder due to methamphetamine use. She
found that his “delusional belief system” was “fairly well
encapsulated,” which means that, except for his beliefs
in the implanted microchip and the conspiracy against
him, his thought processes were normal. It is probable
he was suffering from a paranoid delusion at the [10] time of the offenses. It is possible he was suffering from a state of psychosis at that time. Nakagawa opined that defendant could not, or did not, make a plan of action at the time of the shooting and could not, or did not, act in a purposeful or rational way. Psychiatrist Lloyd Benjamin testified that defendant was admitted to and discharged from the Sacramento County Mental Health Treatment Center on November 16, 1994; he was returned to the center the next day. Defendant exhibited symptoms of psychotic behavior, which were consistent with the jealousy subtype of a delusional disorder. He was diagnosed as having an amphetamine-induced delusional disorder. David Lozano, assistant pastor for the Temple of Pray cable television station, testified that he had known defendant since 1997. In about January 1998, defendant told Lozano that he had heard voices of people in law enforcement stating that, while he was incarcerated, they injected some liquid into him that allowed them to monitor what he was doing and saying. Sam Searcy, retired correctional sergeant for the California Department of Corrections (CDC), testified that he was defendant’s brother-in-law from 1965-1970. After [11] 1970, Searcy never spoke to defendant until
the year 2000, when defendant telephoned him and
asked him the whereabouts of some CDC employees,
whom defendant believed had implanted a device in his
body that was being used to monitor his whereabouts
and communications.
Attorney Michael Faber testified that sometime between
August 1999 and February 2001, defendant asked him to file a lawsuit “Livermore Laboratories” for
Page 4 of 6
placing a liquid microchip in him.
Attorney Danny Brace testified that in February or
March 2000, defendant asked that he represent him at a
television news conference and file a lawsuit against
CDC. Defendant told Brace that CDC had implanted an
undetectable device in his body and was monitoring
him.
David Mar, an ex-neighbor of defendant in about 1998, I
testified that defendant appeared agitated and irritated
toward him in about 1999.
Rebuttal
Clinical psychologist Lorin Frank testified the court
appointed him to evaluate defendant’s competency to
stand trial in March 2001. Frank opined that defendant
probably ingested enough methamphetamine, over a
long enough period of time, so that he gets paranoid
even when he is not using it. Frank diagnosed [12] defendant as suffering from a “chronic delusional disorder, persecutory type”; and a “mixed personality disorder with paranoid and antisocial features.” Frank opined that defendant suffered from the delusional disorder at the time of the shooting, but the disorder did not interfere with his ability to form a plan of action or understand what was happening. Nor was defendant suffering from a delusional belief at the time of the shooting. Defendant’s acts of going to the police station and stating that there had been a shooting and that someone needed help demonstrated his understanding of the events leading up to and after the shooting. Frank opined that “there was some, some good logical reasoning going on at the time in terms of forming a plan of action and making a decision about what to do after the shooting.” Frank testified that defendant’s reported acts prior to the shooting, i.e., trying to hide his gun when people came by, showed that he understood that having a gun out in public was a bad thing to do. In the clinical interview, defendant never told Frank that the microchip was somehow responsible for the shooting. Sanity Phase Clinical psychologist Carolyn Fowle testified [13] she
interviewed defendant in February 2000 to determine
his competence to stand trial. He told her that he was
charged with assault and related his version of the
offenses. He was very vague about his criminal history.
His statements manifested highly bizarre or impossible
delusions, auditory hallucinations (high-frequency
sounds and voices telling him things), and feelings of
persecution. His self-reported behavior satisfied the
diagnostic criteria for paranoid schizophrenia. He had
suffered from the condition for about 10 years but had
not received treatment. Fowle opined that defendant
was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of
the offenses.
Dr. Fowle testified that defendant’s acts of hiding his
gun from police and then turning himself in to police
indicated a consciousness of guilt, thus demonstrating
that he understood the nature and quality of his act and
was able to distinguish right from wrong. His paranoid
schizophrenia would “not necessarily damage his ability
to know the morality or the right or wrong of the action of
shooting.” Fowle believed it was more likely than not
that defendant was sane at the time of the shooting,
but she did not know for sure.
[14] Clinical psychologist Ronald Jennings testified he interviewed defendant in August 2000 to determine his competence to stand trial. Jennings believed that defendant suffered from a “delusion indeterminate disorder,” that he had suffered from the disorder from at least the mid-1990’s to the present, and that he suffered from the disorder at the time of the shooting. Jennings opined that defendant did not have the ability to distinguish right from wrong or know and appreciate the nature and quality of his conduct; that it was more probable than not that he felt the right and the need to defend himself from imminent danger; and that he was legally insane at the time of the offenses. Jennings believed that, when shooting the victim, defendant “knew he was behaving towards the victim in a threatening way, in a way that might have been life threatening for that matter. . . . [P] . . . [P] He understood if he pulled the trigger, he would put a bullet in a person.” Clinical psychologist Jayson Wilkenfield testified that he interviewed defendant in April 2000 to determine his competence to stand trial. He determined that defendant was competent. Before Wilkenfield testified as to [15] defendant’s
sanity, he reviewed police reports; the transcript of the
preliminary hearing; statements from the victim,
defendant’s family and friends, Ricardo Guerra and
David Mar; probation and treatment reports; and
defendant’s writings.
Dr. Wilkenfield opined that “there is some evidence of
psychopathology” that was “of lengthy duration”, and
Page 5 of 6
which would qualify as a mental illness. Having not
interviewed defendant for the purpose of determining his
sanity, the doctor could only hypothesize that defendant
suffered from a delusional disorder or paranoid
schizophrenia. When Wilkenfield interviewed defendant
in April 2000, there was no evidence that defendant was
hallucinating or that his perception was distorted.
Based on his review of documents, Wilkenfield had
“some suspicion” that defendant suffered from a mental
disorder or defect in November 1999 and a “strong
suspicion” that “some type of delusional disorder” had
been extant for “a number of years.” Wilkenfield would
expect that the disorder would affect defendant’s
behavior. Based on the review of records, and subject to
contrary evidence that could be disclosed in an
examination, Wilkenfield had “a strong suspicion”
that [16] defendant’s “ability” to “distinguish right from wrong and appreciate the nature of his act” “would appear to have been compromised.” With the limited information he had, Wilkenfield could not give an opinion as to whether defendant was insane at the time of the offenses. On cross-examination, Wilkenfield acknowledged that defendant’s postshooting acts of driving to the police station and reporting that he had just shot somebody and that the gun was in his vehicle could indicate his state of mind of knowing right from wrong. The parties stipulated that Drs. Nakagawa and Frank were to be appointed by the court to evaluate defendant on the issue of legal sanity. DISCUSSION Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that he was sane at the time of the shooting. He also claims that sending an insane person to prison for life constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Neither point has merit. The defense must prove insanity by a preponderance of evidence. (Pen. Code, § 25, subd. (b); Evid. Code, § 522.) The defendant is insane if, “at the time of the commission of the crime or crimes charged, and as a result of mental disease or defect, the [17] defendant
was ‘incapable of knowing or understanding the nature
and quality of his . . . act’ or ‘of distinguishing right from
wrong . . . .’ (Pen. Code, § 25, subd. (b); see generally
People v. Skinner [(1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 217 Cal. Rptr.
685, 704 P.2d 752,] 768-769, 771- 777.)” (People v.
Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 657 (dis. opn. of
Mosk, J.).) To be incapable of “distinguishing right from
wrong,” the defendant need only be incapable of
distinguishing moral right from moral wrong. (People v.
Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 777-784; see People v.
Coddington, supra, at p. 658.)
“In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of evidence the
appellate court must consider the whole record, view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment,
presume every fact the trier of fact could reasonably
deduce from the evidence, and defer to the trier of fact’s
determination of the weight and credibility of the
evidence.” (People v. Padilla (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 127,
134-135; see People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284,
303-304, 228 Cal. Rptr. 228, 721 P.2d 110.)
Defendant’s arguments overlook [18] these principles of appellate review. Highlighting the evidence in his favor and overlooking or minimizing evidence favorable to the jury’s determination, he claims he “carried his burden of proof at trial” in that he “proved by a preponderance of the evidence” that he “suffered from a chronic, severe mental disorder that rendered him insane at the time of the shooting.” The claim has no merit. As defendant acknowledges, the experts’ opinions were not unanimously in his favor. Dr. Fowle opined that, although defendant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the offenses, his acts of hiding his gun from police and then turning himself in to police indicated a consciousness of guilt, thus demonstrated that he understood the nature and quality of his act and was able to distinguish right from wrong. His paranoid schizophrenia would “not necessarily damage his ability to know the morality or the right or wrong of the action of shooting.” Fowle believed it was more likely than not that defendant was sane at the time of the shooting, but she did not know for sure. Dr. Frank diagnosed defendant as suffering from a chronic delusional disorder — persecutory type — and [19] a mixed personality disorder with paranoid
and antisocial features. Frank opined that defendant
suffered from the delusional disorder at the time of the
shooting, but the disorder did not interfere with his
ability to form a plan of action or understand what was
happening. Nor was defendant suffering from a
delusional belief at the time of the shooting.
Defendant’s acts of going to the police station and
stating that there had been a shooting and that
someone needed help demonstrated his understanding
of the events leading up to and after the shooting.
Dr. Nakagawa did not have an opinion whether
Page 6 of 6
defendant was suffering from a mental disorder on the
date of the shooting. However, she found that his
“delusional belief system” was “fairly well encapsulated,”
which means that, except for his beliefs in the
implanted microchip and the conspiracy against him,
his thought processes were normal. She was unable to
logically explain her opinion that defendant could not
form a rational plan of action at the moment he shot the
victim but may have been able to form a rational plan of
action the moment after he shot the victim.
Similarly, Dr. Wilkenfield could not give an opinion as to
whether [20] defendant was insane at the time of the offenses. Wilkenfield had “some suspicion” that defendant suffered from a mental disorder or defect in November 1999 and a “strong suspicion” that “some type of delusional disorder” had been extant for “a number of years.” He had a “strong suspicion” that defendant’s “ability” to “distinguish right from wrong and appreciate the nature of his act” “would appear to have been compromised,” but he admitted that defendant’s acts of driving to the police station and reporting that he had just shot somebody could demonstrate knowledge that he “had just done something wrong.” Dr. Jennings opined that defendant did not have the ability to distinguish right from wrong or to know and appreciate the nature and quality of his conduct; that it was more probable than not that he felt the right and the need to defend himself from imminent danger; and that he was legally insane at the time of the offenses. However, Dr. Jennings also believed that defendant “knew he was behaving towards the victim in a threatening way, in a way that might have been life threatening for that matter,” and that defendant “understood if he pulled the trigger, he would put a bullet [21] in a person.”
In light of the evidence of defendant’s preshooting
conduct in which he hid his gun when a car approached
or people walked by, and when the police questioned
him about his gun, and in light of his postshooting
conduct of driving to the police station and reporting that
he had just shot somebody, the jury could rationally
reject the testimony of Drs. Jennings, Nakagawa and
Wilkenfield to the extent their testimony stated or
implied that defendant was legally insane. The jury’s
finding of sanity is supported by sufficient evidence. A
fortiori, defendant’s sentence does not constitute cruel
or unusual punishment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HULL, J.
We concur:
DAVIS, Acting P.J.
NICHOLSON, J.
End of D
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